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Abstract
Over the last decade, a new idea challenging the
classical self-non-self viewpoint has become
popular amongst immunologists. It is called the
Danger Theory. In this conceptual paper, we
look at this theory from the perspective of
Artificial Immune System practitioners. An
overview of the Danger Theory is presented with
particular emphasis on analogies in the Artificial
Immune Systems world. A number of potential
application areas are then used to provide a
framing for a critical assessment of the concept,
and its relevance for Artificial Immune Systems.
1 INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, a new theory has become popular
amongst immunologists. It is called the Danger Theory,
and its chief advocate is Matzinger [18], [19] and [20]. A
number of advantages are claimed for this theory; not
least that it provides a method of ‘grounding’ the immune
response. The theory is not complete, and there are some
doubts about how much it actually changes behaviour and
/ or structure. Nevertheless, the theory contains enough
potentially interesting ideas to make it worth assessing its
relevance to Artificial Immune Systems.
It should be noted that we do not intend to defend this
theory, which is still controversial [21]. Rather we are
interested in its merits for Artificial Immune System
applications and hence its actual existence in the humoral
immune system is of little importance to us. Our question
is: Can it help us build better Artificial Immune Systems?
Few other Artificial Immune System practitioners are
aware of the Danger Theory, notable exceptions being
Burgess [5] and Willamson [22]. Hence, this is the first
paper that deals directly with the Danger Theory, and it is
the authors’ intention that this paper stimulates discussion
in our research community.
In the next section, we provide an overview of the Danger
Theory, pointing out, where appropriate, some analogies
in current Artificial Immune System models. We then
assess the relevance of the theory for Artificial Immune
System security applications, which is probably the most
obvious application area for the danger model. Other
Artificial Immune System application areas are also
considered. Finally, we draw some preliminary
conclusions about the potential of the Danger concept.
2 THE DANGER THEORY
The immune system is commonly thought to work at
three levels: External barriers (skin, mucus), innate
immunity and the acquired or adaptive immune system.
As part of the third and most complex level, B-
Lymphocytes secrete specific antibodies that recognise
and react to stimuli. It is this pattern matching between
antibodies and antigens that lies at the heart of most
Artificial Immune System implementations. Another type
of cell, the T (killer) lymphocyte, is also important in
different types of immune reactions. Although not usually
present in Artificial Immune System models, the
behaviour of this cell is implicated in the Danger model
and so it is included here. From the Artificial Immune
System practitioner’s point of view, the T killer cells
match stimuli in much the same way as antibodies do.
However, it is not simply a question of matching in the
humoral immune system. It is fundamental that only the
‘correct’ cells are matched as otherwise this could lead to
a self-destructive autoimmune reaction. Classical
immunology [12] stipulates that an immune response is
triggered when the body encounters something non-self or
foreign. It is not yet fully understood how this self-non-
self discrimination is achieved, but many immunologists
believe that the difference between them is learnt early in
life. In particular it is thought that the maturation process
plays an important role to achieve self-tolerance by
eliminating those T and B cells that react to self. In
addition, a ‘confirmation’ signal is required; that is, for
either B cell or T (killer) cell activation, a T (helper)
lymphocyte must also be activated. This dual activation is
further protection against the chance of accidentally
reacting to self.
Matzinger’s Danger Theory debates this point of view
(for a good introduction, see Matzinger [18]). Technical
overviews can be found in Matzinger [19] and Matzinger
[20]. She points out that there must be discrimination
happening that goes beyond the self-non-self distinction
described above. For instance:
• There is no immune reaction to foreign bacteria in the
gut or to the food we eat although both are foreign
entities.
• Conversely, some auto-reactive processes are useful,
for example against self molecules expressed by
stressed cells.
• The definition of self is problematic – realistically,
self is confined to the subset actually seen by the
lymphocytes during maturation.
• The human body changes over its lifetime and thus
self changes as well. Therefore, the question arises
whether defences against non-self learned early in
life might be autoreactive later.
• Other aspects that seem to be at odds with the
traditional viewpoint are autoimmune diseases and
certain types of tumours that are fought by the
immune system (both attacks against self) and
successful transplants (no attack against non-self).
Matzinger concludes that the immune system actually
discriminates “some self from some non-self”. She asserts
that the Danger Theory introduces not just new labels, but
a way of escaping the semantic difficulties with self and
non-self, and thus provides grounding for the immune
response. If we accept the Danger Theory as valid we can
take care of ‘non-self but harmless’ and of ‘self but
harmful’ invaders into our system. To see how this is
possible, we will have to examine the theory in more
detail.
The central idea in the Danger Theory is that the immune
system does not respond to non-self but to danger. Thus,
just like the self-non-self theories, it fundamentally
supports the need for discrimination. However, it differs
in the answer to what should be responded to. Instead of
responding to foreignness, the immune system reacts to
danger.
This theory is borne out of the observation that there is no
need to attack everything that is foreign, something that
seems to be supported by the counter examples above. In
this theory, danger is measured by damage to cells
indicated by distress signals that are sent out when cells
die an unnatural death (cell stress or lytic cell death, as
opposed to programmed cell death, or apoptosis).
Figure 1 depicts how we might picture an immune
response according to the Danger Theory. A cell that is in
distress sends out an alarm signal, whereupon antigens in
the neighbourhood are captured by antigen-presenting
cells such as macrophages, which then travel to the local
lymph node and present the antigens to lymphocytes.
Essentially, the danger signal establishes a danger zone
around itself. Thus B cells producing antibodies that
match antigens within the danger zone get stimulated and
undergo the clonal expansion process. Those that do not
match or are too far away do not get stimulated.
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Figure 1: Danger Theory Model.
Matzinger admits that the exact nature of the danger
signal is unclear. It may be a ‘positive’ signal (for
example heat shock protein release) or a ‘negative’ signal
(for example lack of synaptic contact with a dendritic
antigen-presenting cell). This is where the Danger Theory
shares some of the problems associated with traditional
self-non-self discrimination (i.e. how to discriminate
danger from non-danger). However, in this case, the
signal is grounded rather than being some abstract
representation of danger.
Another way of looking at the danger model is to see it as
an extension of the Two-Signal model by Bretscher and
Cohn [4]. In this model, the two signals are antigen
recognition (signal one) and co-stimulation (signal two).
Co-stimulation is a signal that means “this antigen really
is foreign” or, in the Danger Theory, “this antigen really
is dangerous”. How the signal arises will be explained
later. The Danger Theory then operates by applying three
laws to lymphocyte behaviour (the laws of lymphotics
[20]):
• Law 1. Become activated if you receive signals one
and two together. Die if you receive signal one in the
absence of signal two. Ignore signal two without
signal one.
• Law 2. Accept signal two from antigen-presenting
cells only (or, for B cells, from T helper cells). B
cells can act as antigen-presenting cells only for
experienced (memory) T cells. Note that signal one
can come from any cells, not just antigen-presenting
cells.
• Law 3. After activation (activated cells do not need
signal two) revert to resting state after a short time.
For the mature lymphocyte, (whether virgin or
experienced) these rules are adhered to. However, there
are two exceptions in the lymphocyte lifecycle. Firstly,
immature cells are unable to accept signal two from any
source. This enables an initial negative selection
screening to occur. Secondly, activated (effector) cells
respond only to signal one (ignoring signal two), but
revert to the resting state shortly afterwards.
An implication of this theory is that autoreactive effects
are not necessarily harmful, and are in fact expected
during an infection. This is because any lymphocyte
reacting to an antigen in the ‘danger zone’ will be
activated. These antigens are not necessarily the culprits
for the danger signal. If they are, then the reacting
lymphocytes will continue to be restimulated until the
antigens (and therefore the danger signal) are removed.
After this, they will rest, receiving neither signal one nor
signal two.
On the other hand, lymphocytes reacting to innocuous
(self) antigens will continue to receive signal one from
these antigens, even after the danger (and therefore signal
two) has vanished. Therefore these lymphocytes will be
deleted, and tolerance will be achieved. However, further
autoreactive effects can be expected, partly because ‘self’
changes over time, and partly because of new lymphocyte
generation (particularly B cells, which produce
hypermutated clones during activation).
A problem is posed by the antigen-presenting cell itself,
whose (innocuous) antigens are by definition always in
the danger zone. Lymphocytes reacting to these antigens
might destroy the antigen-presenting cell and thus
interfere with the immune response. The negative
selection of immature lymphocytes protects against this
possibility.
Figure 2 shows a more detailed picture of how the Danger
Theory can be viewed as an extension of immune signals.
These diagrams are adapted from those presented in
Matzinger [19] except for the sixth, which incorporates
suggestions made in Matzinger [20].
In the original view of the world by Burnet [6], only
signal one is considered. This is shown in the first
diagram, where the only signal shown is that between
infectious agents and lymphocytes (B cells, marked B,
and T killer, marked Tk). Signal two (second diagram)
was introduced by Bretscher and Cohn [4]. This helper
signal comes from a T helper cell (marked Th), on receipt
of signal one from the B cell. That is, the B cell presents
antigens to the T helper cell and awaits the T cell’s
confirmation signal. If the T cell recognises the antigen
(which, if negative selection has worked, should mean the
antigen is non-self) then the immune response can
commence. It was Lafferty and Cuningham [17] who
proposed that the T helper cells themselves also need to
be ‘switched on’ by signals one and two, both from
antigen-presenting cells. This process is depicted in the
third diagram.
Note that the T helper cell gets signal one from two
sources – the B cell and the antigen-presenting cell. In the
former case the antigens are not chosen randomly – the
very opposite, since B cells are highly selective for a
range of (hopefully non-self) antigens. In the latter case,
the antigens are chosen randomly (the antigen-presenting
cell simply presents any antigen it picks up) but signal
two should only be provided to the T helper cell for non-
self antigens. It is not necessarily clear how the antigen-
presenting cell ‘knows’ the antigen is non-self. Janeway
[14] introduced the idea of infectious non-self (for
example bacteria), which ‘primes’ antigen presenting
cells, i.e. causing signal two to be produced (fourth
diagram). This priming signal is labelled as signal 0 in the
figures.
Matzinger proposes to allow priming of antigen-
presenting cells by a danger signal (fifth diagram). She
also proposes to extend the efficacy of T helper cells by
routing signal two through antigen presenting cells [20].
We have marked this as ‘signal 3’ in the sixth diagram
(although Matzinger does not use that term, the intention
is clear). In Matzinger’s words “the antigen seen by the
killer need not be the same as the helper; the only
requirement is that they must both be presented by the
same antigen-presenting cell”. This arrangement allows T
helper cells to prime many more T killer cells than they
would otherwise have been able to.
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Figure 2: Danger Theory viewed as immune signals.
The Danger Theory is not without its limitations. As
mentioned, the exact nature of the danger signal is still
unclear. Also, there is sometimes danger that should not
be responded to (cuts, transplants). In fact, in the case of
transplants it is often necessary to remove the antigen-
presenting cells from the transplanted organ. Finally, the
fact that autoimmune diseases do still, if rarely, happen,
has yet to be fully reconciled with the Danger Theory.
3 THE DANGER THEORY AND SOME
ANALOGIES TO ARTIFICIAL
IMMUNE SYSTEMS
Danger theory clearly has many facets and intricacies, and
we have touched on only a few. It might be instructive to
list a number of considerations for an Artificial Immune
System practitioner regarding the suitability of the danger
model for their application. The basic consideration is
whether negative selection is important. If so, then these
points may be relevant:
• Negative selection is bound to be imperfect, and
therefore autoreactions (false positives) are
inevitable.
• The self/non-self boundary is blurred since self and
non-self antigens often share common regions.
• Self changes over time. Therefore, one can expect
problems with memory cells, which later turn out to
be inaccurate or even autoreactive.
If these points are sufficient to make a practitioner
consider incorporating the Danger theory into their model,
then the following considerations may be instructive:
1. A danger model requires an antigen-presenting cell,
which can present an appropriate danger signal.
2. ‘Danger’ is an emotive term. The signal may have
nothing to do with danger (see, for example, our
discussion on data mining applications in section 5).
3. The appropriate danger signal can be positive
(presence of signal) or negative (absence).
4. The danger zone in biology is spatial. In Artificial
Immune System applications, some other measure of
proximity (for instance temporal) may be used.
5. If there is an analogue of an immune response, it
should not lead to further danger signals. In biology,
killer cells cause a normal cell death, not danger.
6. Matzinger proposes priming killer cells via antigen-
presenting cells for greater effect. Depending on the
immune system used (it only makes sense for
spatially distributed models) this proposal may be
relevant.
7. There are a variety of considerations that are less
directly related to the danger model. For example,
migration – how many antibodies receive signal
one/two from a given antigen-presenting cell? In
addition, the danger theory relies on concentrations,
i.e. continuous not binary matching.
There are also a couple of points that might tempt a
practitioner to alter the danger model as presented here.
For example, the danger model has quite a number of
elements. Given that the antigen-presenting cell mediates
the danger signal, we might be able to simplify the model
– for example, do we still need a T helper cell? In
addition, there are some danger signals that might in some
sense be ‘appropriate’ and thus should not trigger an
immune response. In such cases, a method for avoiding
the danger pathway must be found. A biological example
is transplanted organs, in which antigen-presenting cells
are removed.
4 THE DANGER THEORY AND
ANOMALY DETECTION
An intriguing area for the application of Artificial
Immune Systems is the detection of anomalies such as
computer viruses, fraudulent transactions or hardware
faults. The underlying metaphor seems to fit particularly
nicely here, as there is a system (self) that has to be
protected against intruders (non-self). Thus if natural
immune systems have enabled biological species to
survive, can we not create Artificial Immune Systems to
do the same to our computers, machines etc? Presumably
those systems would then have the same beneficial
properties as natural immune systems like error tolerance,
distribution, adaptation and self-monitoring. A recent
overview of biologically inspired approaches to this area
can be found in Williamson [22].
In this section we will present indicative examples of such
artificial systems, explain their current shortcomings and
show how the Danger Theory might help overcome some
of these.
One of the first such approaches is presented by Forrest et
al [11] and extended by Hofmeyr and Forrest [13]. This
work is concerned with building an Artificial Immune
System that is able to detect non-self in the area of
network security where non-self is defined as an
undesired connection. All connections are modelled as
binary strings and there is a set of known good and bad
connections, which is used to train and evaluate the
algorithm. To build the Artificial Immune System,
random binary strings are created called detectors.
These detectors then undergo a maturation phase where
they are presented with good, i.e. self, connections. If they
match any of these they are eliminated otherwise they
become mature, but not activated. If during their further
lifetime these mature detectors match anything else,
exceeding a certain threshold value, they become
activated. This is then reported to a human operator who
decides whether there is a true anomaly. If so the
detectors are promoted to memory detectors with an
indefinite life span and minimum activation threshold.
Thus, this is similar to the secondary response in the
natural immune system, for instance after immunisation.
An approach such as the above is known in Artificial
Immune Systems as negative selection as only those
detectors (antibodies) that do not match live on. It is
thought that T cells mature in similar fashion in the
thymus such that only those survive and mature that do
not match any self cells after a certain amount of time.
An alternative approach to negative selection is that of
positive selection as used for instance by Forrest et al [9]
and by Somayaji and Forrest [22]. These systems are a
reversal of the negative selection algorithm described
above with the difference that detectors for self are
evolved. From a performance point of view there are
advantages and disadvantages for both methods. A
suspect non-self string would have to be compared with
all self-detectors to establish that it is non-self, whilst with
negative selection the first matching detector would stop
the comparison. On the other hand, for a self-string this is
reversed giving positive selection the upper hand. Thus,
performance depends on the self to non-self ratio, which
should generally favour positive selection.
However, there is another difference between the two
approaches: the nature of false alarms. With negative
selection inadequate detectors will result in false
negatives (missed intrusions) whilst with positive
selection there will be false positives (false alarms). The
preference between the two in this case is likely to be
problem specific.
Both approaches have been extended further [10]
including better co-stimulation methods and activation
thresholds to reduce the number of false alarms, multiple
antibody sub-populations for improved diversity and
coverage and improved partial matching rules. Recently,
similar approaches have also been used to detect hardware
faults (Bradley and Tyrrell [1]), network intrusion (Kim
and Bentley [16]) and fault tolerance (Burgess [5]).
What are the remaining challenges for a successful use of
Artificial Immune Systems for anomaly detection?
Firstly, self and non-self will usually evolve and change
during the lifetime of the system. Hence, to be effective,
any system used must be robust and flexible enough to
cope with changing circumstances. Based on the
performance of their natural counterparts, Artificial
Immune Systems should be well suited to provide these
qualities. Secondly, appropriate representations of self
and good matching rules have to be developed. Most
research so far has been concentrated in these two areas
and good advances have been made so far [8].
However, as pointed out by Kim and Bentley [15], scaling
is a problem with negative selection. As the systems to be
protected grow larger and larger so does self and non-self
and it becomes more and more problematic to find a set of
detectors that provides adequate coverage whilst being
computationally efficient. It is inefficient, if not
impossible, to map the entire non-self universe,
particularly as it will be changing over time. The same
applies to positive selection and trying to map all of self.
Moreover, the approaches so far have another
disadvantage: A response requires infection beyond a
certain threshold and human intervention confirming this.
Although one might argue that the operator sees fewer
alarms than in an unaided system, this clearly is not yet
the ideal situation of an autonomous system preventing all
damage. Apart from the resource implication of a human
component, an unduly long delay might be caused by this
necessity prolonging the time the system is exposed. This
situation might be further aggravated by the fact that the
labels self and non-self are often ambiguous and expert
knowledge might be required to apply them correctly.
How can these problems be overcome? We believe that
applying ideas from the Danger Theory can help building
better Artificial Immune Systems by providing a different
way of grounding and removing the necessity to map self
or non-self. To achieve this self-non-self discrimination
will still be useful but it is no longer essential. This is
because non-self no longer causes an immune response.
Instead, it will be danger signals that trigger a reaction.
What could such danger signals be? They should show up
after limited infection to minimise damage and hence
have to be quickly and automatically measurable. Suitable
signals could include:
• Too low or too high memory usage.
• Inappropriate disk activity.
• Unexpected frequency of file changes as measured
for example by checksums or file size.
• SIGABRT signal from abnormally terminated UNIX
processes.
• Presence of non-self.
Of course, it would also be possible to use ‘positive’
signals, as discussed in the previous section, such as the
absence of some normal ‘health’ signals.
Once the danger signal has been transmitted, the immune
system can then react to those antigens, for example,
executables or connections, which are ‘near’ the emitter
of the danger signal. Note that ‘near’ does not necessarily
mean geographical or physical closeness, something that
might make sense for connections and their IP addresses
but probably not for computer executables in general. In
essence, the physical ‘near’ that the Danger Theory
requires for the immune system is a proxy measure for
causality. Hence, we can substitute it with more
appropriate causality measures such as similar execution
start times, concurrent runtimes or access of the same
resources.
Consequently, those antibodies or detectors that match
(first signal) those antigens within a radius, defined by a
measure such as the above (second signal), will
proliferate. Having thereby identified the dangerous
components, further confirmation could then be sought by
sending it to a special part of the system simulating
another attack. This would have the further advantage of
not having to send all detectors to confirm danger. In
conclusion, using these ideas from the Danger Theory has
provided a better grounding of danger labels in
comparison to self / non-self, whilst at the same time
relying less on human competence.
5 THE DANGER THEORY AND OTHER
ARTIFICIAL IMMUNE SYSTEM
APPLICATIONS
It is not immediately obvious how the Danger Theory
could be of use to data mining problems such as the
movie prediction problem described in Cayzer and
Aickelin [7], because the notions of self and non-self are
not used. In essence, in data mining all of the system is
self. More precisely, it is not an issue what is self or non-
self as the designer of the database has complete control
over this aspect.
However, if the labels self and non-self were to be
replaced by interesting and non-interesting data for
example, a distinction would prove beneficial. In this
case, the immune system is being applied as a classifier. If
one can then further assume that interesting data is
located ‘close’ or ‘near’ to other interesting data, ideas
from the Danger Theory can come into play again. To do
so, it is necessary to define ‘close’ / ‘near’. We could use:
• Physical closeness, for instance distance in the
database as measured by an appropriate metric.
• Correlation of data, as measured by statistical tools.
• Similar entry times into the database.
• File size.
A danger signal could thus be interpreted as a valuable
piece of information that has been uncovered. Hence,
those antibodies are stimulated that match data that is
‘close’ this valuable piece of information.
Taking this idea further, we might define the danger
signal as an indication of user interest. Given this
definition, we can speculate about various scenarios in
which the danger signal could be of use. One such
scenario is outlined below for illustrative purposes.
Imagine a user browsing a set of documents. Each
document has a set of features (for instance keywords,
title, author, date etc). Imagine further that there is an
immune system implemented as a ‘watcher’, whose
antibodies match document features. ‘Interesting’
documents are those, whose features are matched by the
immune system.
When a user either explicitly or implicitly indicates
interest in the current document, a “danger” signal is
raised. This causes signal two to be passed, along with
signal one, to antibodies matching any antigen, i.e.
document feature, in the danger zone, i.e. this document.
Stimulated antibodies become effectors, and thus the
immune system learns to become a good filter when
searching for other interesting documents. Interesting
documents could be brought to the user’s attention (the
exact mechanism is not relevant here). The important
thing is that the user’s idea of an ‘interesting’ document
may change over time and so it is important that the
immune system adapts in a timely way to such a changing
definition of (non-) self.
Meanwhile, every document browsed by the user
(whether interesting or not) will be presented to the
antibodies as ‘signal one’. Uninteresting document
features will therefore give rise to signal one without
signal two, which will tolerate the autoreactive antibodies.
The net effect is to produce a set of antibodies that match
only interesting document features.
As mentioned, this example is purely illustrative but it
does show that ideas from the Danger theory may have
implications for Artificial Immune System applications in
domains where the relevance of ‘danger’ is far from
obvious.
6 CONCLUSIONS
To conclude, the Danger Theory is not about the way
Artificial Immune Systems represent data. Instead, it
provides ideas about which data the Artificial Immune
Systems should represent and deal with. They should
focus on dangerous, i.e. interesting data.
It could be argued that the shift from non-self to danger is
merely a symbolic label change that achieves nothing. We
do not believe this to be the case, since danger is a
grounded signal, and non-self is (typically) a set of feature
vectors with no further information about their meaning.
The danger signal helps us to identify which subset of
feature vectors is of interest. A suitably defined danger
signal thus overcomes many of the limitations of self-non-
self selection. It restricts the domain of non-self to a
manageable size, removes the need to screen against all
self, and deals adaptively with scenarios where self (or
non-self) changes over time.
The challenge is clearly to define a suitable danger signal,
a choice that might prove as critical as the choice of
fitness function for an evolutionary algorithm. In addition,
the physical distance in the biological system should be
translated into a suitable proxy measure for similarity or
causality in an Artificial Immune System. We have made
some suggestions in this paper about how to tackle these
challenges in a variety of domains, but the process is not
likely to be trivial. Nevertheless, if these challenges are
met, then future Artificial Immune System applications
might derive considerable benefit, and new insights, from
the Danger Theory.
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